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Summary
CEO duality – the practice of a single individual serving both as the company chief executive officer and
the chairman of the board – has been the subject of academic interest and debate for some time. Despite
such interest, the academic literature presents disparate results in this field and fails to identify a definitive
causal link between CEO duality and firm performance.
This paper examines the impact of CEO duality on firm performance in Japan specifically via two
analyses: (i) a quantitative analysis of CEO duality impact on firm performance in Japanese publicly listed
companies; and (ii) a qualitative analysis by looking into the case of Carlos Ghosn, the former CEO and
Chairman of Nissan, who has been arrested due to alleged self-enrichment, false reporting of annual
remuneration, and aggravated breach of trust.
The findings of the quantitative analysis present no statistically significant link between CEO duality and
firm performance, which is in line with the academic literature in this field. However, it finds that Japanese
publicly listed companies with a higher percentage of outside directors enjoy better financial returns. It
also finds that companies with a higher percentage of outside directors are more likely to adopt a non-
duality structure.
Taking these findings into consideration, it could be deduced that companies seeking to improve firm
performance by increasing the percentage of outside directors are more likely to end up with a non-duality
structure ultimately.
As for the qualitative analysis, it finds that while the impact of foreign institutional investment and
globalisation will push for non-duality in corporate Japan, the outcome of Ghosn’s case cannot be solely
attributed to CEO duality and may be due to several poor corporate governance practices at play. It further
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notes that the case of Ghosn could be an anomaly rather than a systemic issue of corporate governance in
Japan.
Accordingly, it may be that Ghosn’s case, on its own, is not sufficient to steer the Japanese government
towards a corporate governance reform. The paper notes that even if a reform is to take place, CEO duality
may not necessarily be addressed in such reform, as it is not necessarily perceived as a problematic
behaviour in corporate Japan.
However, as past corporate governance reforms in Japan have taken place due to corporate scandals of this
scale, the paper finds that there is a possibility (rather than a high likelihood) of further reform due to
Ghosn’s case, especially in light of the coverage it has received.
The paper notes that if reform is to take place, it may take place informally (i.e. companies opting for non-
duality and adopting better corporate governance structures despite the lack of a legal mandate to enforce
such behaviour) and/or formally (i.e. revision of laws, regulations, and/or the corporate governance code in
Japan to enforce such behaviour).
The paper finally concludes by noting that the Japanese government should be careful if it is to introduce
formal reforms to address non-duality due to the unintended negative consequences it may have on the
performance of Japanese companies. It also suggests that Japanese companies seeking better financial
returns should increase the percentage of outside directors in their boards, which in turn will likely steer
the companies toward non-duality structures. It further notes that Japanese companies with non-duality
structures are more likely to receive foreign institutional investment than companies that continue to adopt
CEO duality corporate structures.
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CEO duality – the practice of a single individual serving both as the company chief executive officer and
the chairman of the board – has been the subject of academic interest and debate for some time. This
paper examines the impact of CEO duality on firm performance in Japanese listed companies and the case
of Carlos Ghosn, former chairman and chief executive officer of Nissan, to determine if CEO duality
negatively impacts Japanese companies and whether this case will lead to a corporate governance reform
in Japan. The findings of this paper suggest that increasing the percentage of outside directors would both
improve firm performance and curb the potential negative effects associated with CEO duality.
Keywords: CEO duality; corporate governance; Carlos Ghosn; Nissan; Japan.
1 Introduction
The infamous case of Nissan’s ex-chairman, Carlos Ghosn, has led to the downfall of one Japan’s
automotive industry legends, commonly known as ‘Le Cost Killer’. Known for saving Nissan from the
brink of bankruptcy and the architect behind the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance, the largest alliance of
its kind, Ghosn’s success was revered by many and the subject of several business articles and studies.
However, with recent allegations against him ranging from dubious investments to self-enrichment, Ghosn
has fallen from grace and many have come to wonder how he was able to get away with such corporate
misconduct undetected and for so long.
The root cause of these issues may lie in the corporate governance of Nissan, where Ghosn was for nine
years: (i) the chairman of the board of directors (Chair); (ii) the chief executive officer (CEO); and (iii)
the Chair and CEO of Renault S.A. (Renault), Nissan’s majority shareholder, all the same time, allowing
Ghosn to reign without effective oversight.
Corporate governance is a relatively recent concept that has evolved rapidly during the past decade to
encompass a wide array of issues, such as corporate social responsibility, shareholder and stakeholder
participation in decision-making, and climate change. It commonly takes the form of a framework,
mandating the principles and rules that companies should abide by to address the aforementioned issues
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012).
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A core aspect of corporate governance is the leadership structure of companies. One of the structures that
has received significant attention recently is the practice of vesting the authority of the two most powerful
positions in the company into one individual, namely the CEO and the Chair. This practice is known as
‘CEO duality’ (Rechner and Dalton, 1991).
CEO duality has been the subject of considerable academic debate, with agency theory advocates pushing
for the separation of the roles, on the one hand, and stewardship theory proponents arguing that CEO
duality can enhance firm performance, on the other (Barney, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991).
However, the empirical literature investigating a causal link between CEO duality and firm performance
has yielded, at best, mixed results. Dalton et al. (1998) find that there is no statistically significant
evidence of an empirical relation between CEO duality and firm performance, whereas Dalton and Dalton
(2011) find that there is virtually no evidence relating the financial performance of a firm to CEO duality.
Despite the lack of a statistically significant link between CEO duality and firm performance, there is a
clear trend in both the U.S. and Europe towards separating the two roles, whether due to regulation
requirements or pressure from activist shareholders. This trend, on the other hand, does not seem to be
present in Japan.
Japan’s current legal framework does not require the separation of the CEO and Chair roles nor does it
employ the ‘comply or explain’ approach towards this practice. Given the continued academic interest in
this topic, the global developments towards separating the two roles, and the recent case of Carlos Ghosn
at hand, this paper seeks to assess whether the practice of CEO duality in Japan should be revised in light
of the Ghosn scandal and the global trend towards separation.
Accordingly, the research question that this paper seeks to address is as follows:
Should publicly listed companies in Japan avoid the practice of CEO duality?
In addressing this research question, the following chapter shall firstly present the corporate governance
developments that led to the practice of separating the CEO and Chair roles, followed by highlighting the
recent trend of non-duality in both U.S. and Europe. The corporate governance developments in Japan
shall then be presented, noting the reforms therein to promote better corporate governance practices.
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The third chapter shall then present the literature review for and against CEO duality, highlighting the
academic research conducted in this field and the results that it has yielded. Once that chapter has been
covered, the hypotheses that are based on the research question shall be presented, followed by the
methodology and results of the quantitative research conducted.
The results of the quantitative research shall then be presented, followed by a qualitative analysis with
specific focus on the case of Carlos Ghosn. Finally, the discussion and conclusion shall be presented as
derived from the quantitative and qualitative analyses conducted.1
2 Corporate Governance Developments
Corporate governance practices first became a subject of attention in the 1980s and were addressed
significantly by the Cadbury Report in 1992, leading the London Stock Exchange to require all listed
companies to include a statement in their annual reports noting their degree of compliance to the practices
presented in the Cadbury Report (Shah and Napier, 2016).
In 1999, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a set of
corporate governance principles that would eventually be revised in 2004. This set of practices became to
be considered the ‘gold standard’ for corporate governance (OECD, 2015).
A series of corporate scandals across different jurisdictions pushed for further corporate governance
reforms, such as the case of the European Union, which published in 2003 a communication labelled
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to
Move Forward” (European Commission, 2003).
In the case of the United States, the Enron corporate scandal, alongside other high-profile cases, led to the
enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 (Carlson, 2019).
As a result, the landscape for stock markets has changed significantly during the past 20 years. One of the
changes is ownership patterns. According to De La Cruz et al. (2019), there are four main categories of
investors in publicly listed companies, which are:
(i) institutional investors;
1
Note: For the purposes of this paper, no differentiation is considered between the “CEO” or “President”
positions, as both positions are usually considered the highest executive positions in their respective firms.
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(ii) public sector owners;
(iii) private corporations; and
(iv) strategic individual investors.
Institutional investors, which is a term that encompasses mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds
that manage other people’s money, are the largest and most influential category of investors, holding 41%
of the global market capitalization followed by the public sector at 20%. Being at the forefront,
institutional investors often engage in and push for better corporate governance practices (OECD, 2019).
These efforts have borne fruit, as corporate governance frameworks have improved globally. According to
an OECD survey of 49 jurisdictions, nearly half revised their corporate governance codes since 2015, with
83% of these jurisdictions implementing the ‘comply or explain’ practice (OECD, 2019).
The practice of ‘comply or explain’, considered a global corporate governance tool, was first introduced in
the UK and consists of two elements: (i) a voluntary compliance mechanism with the provisions of
corporate governance codes; and (ii) a mandatory declaration mechanism, whereby the subjects are
required to declare if they have complied with the provision in question or otherwise explain the reason
behind deviating from compliance (Fasterling and Duhamel, 2009).
Japan is an example of a country that has both revised its corporate governance code and introduced the
‘comply or explain’ practice. In June 2015, a new corporate governance code was implemented in Japan
for publicly listed companies, which required companies to follow the ‘comply or explain’ practice for the
implementation of the principles listed in the code.
As for the practice of separating the CEO from the Chair, the aforementioned OECD survey provides that
the recommendation or requirement for separation has doubled in the last four years, with 30% of all 49
jurisdictions requiring the separation of the two posts, and another 40% recommending their separation
(OECD, 2019). The 2015 figures of the same survey show that only 11% of the jurisdictions required
separation of the roles, whereas another 25% recommended their separation (OECD, 2015).
As described in the chapter below, there is a clear global trend towards separating the CEO and Chair
positions, even when the laws and regulations do not necessarily require such separation.
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2.1 United States of America
In the United States, the percentage of S&P 500 companies with the CEO serving also as the Chair has
dropped down to 45.6% in 2018, compared with 48.7% the year before (Sun, 2019).
As per the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, public companies are not
required to split the CEO and Chair roles, but are required to disclose CEO duality and explain the
rationale behind the decision, an approach that is similar to the ‘comply or explain’ principle to a certain
extent (Rezaee et. al, 2012).
This trend of unbundling the two posts has been steered, in part, due to a number of high-profile cases,
such as the case of Tesla Inc.’s CEO, Elon Musk, who quit the Chair position, as part of a lawsuit
settlement with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, due to Musk misleading investors through a
series of tweets that he had posted on Twitter (Sun, 2019).
Another example is the case of Boeing, which had its CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, stripped of his role as
Chair due to the crisis the company faced from two Boeing 737 Max crashes. A more recent example is
WeWork’s parent company, We Co, where the co-founder, ex-Chair, and ex-CEO, Adam Neumann,
stepped down from both the CEO and Chair roles due to the corporate scandals associated with his
behaviour (Gryta and Francis, 2020).
Excessive and unnecessary expenditure is a common trait of C-level corporate scandals, such as the case of
General Electric’s ex-CEO’s, who would use two corporate jets for business travel, with one jet following
the other, sometimes as close as being a few minutes apart.
The excuse for using a second plane for the CEO was to “provide additional security and to have a spare in
case of a breakdown”, a treatment that not even heads of state receive. This behaviour came to light after a
whistle-blower complaint was raised and presented to the board, leading to the end of the practice by 2014
(Stewart, 2017).
Johnson & Johnson is also another company that is facing pressure to separate the CEO and Chair roles
due to the numerous scandals it has faced in the past, including its opioid litigation. The pressure to
separate was in the form of a shareholder proposal by Trillium Asset Management, citing a PwC survey
that found that “57% of directors said it was difficult to voice dissent when there’s a CEO/chair in the
group” (Sagonowsky, 2020).
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Shareholders continue to push for this trend, as demonstrated by Facebook’s annual shareholder meeting in
2019, where it was proposed that an independent chairperson be appointed instead of having Mark
Zuckerberg, CEO and Chair, continue to hold both roles. This attempt failed, but nevertheless presented
shareholder intentions towards this issue (Foster, 2019).
Other failed attempts by the shareholders to separate the roles include the case of JPMorgan Chase, where
the shareholders attempted to separate the role of the CEO and Chair twice, once in 2006 and again in
2012, but to no avail (Foster, 2019).
Another trend worth noting in the U.S. is that once a new CEO is appointed, company shareholders tend to
utilise the opportunity to separate the CEO and Chair roles, as evidenced by a 2016 Stanford study,
presenting that this course of action takes place 78% of the time (Larcker and Tayan, 2016).
Recent examples of this behaviour include AT&T, which announced at the end of 2019 that it would split
the role of its CEO and Chair once the current CEO and Chair Randal Stephenson steps down (Sahadi,
2019). Other examples include Nike Inc. and Under Armour Inc., both of which had their long-time CEOs
step down from the CEO position and remain as Chairs of their respective companies.
2.2 Europe
Europe paints a similar picture to the U.S, as the percentage of Stoxx Europe 600 companies with the CEO
serving as the Chair has also declined to 9.2% in 2018, compared to 11% in 2013 (Sun, 2019).
Some European countries require the separation of both posts, as is the case in the UK. For other countries,
such as the countries in the European Union, the separation of the roles has been mandated for financial
institutions pursuant to EU Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the
prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms.
Where separation is not mandated by law, asset management companies in recent years have stepped in to
push for separation of the roles. Legal and General Investment Management, one of the UK’s largest asset
managers, recently announced that it would no longer tolerate the practice of CEO duality and would
refuse to invest in such companies (Hinks, 2020).
However, this trend has not been met without resistance by some companies, such as the case of LVMH,
Telefonica, and Vinci, all of which continue to hold on to the practice of CEO duality (Hinks, 2019).
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2.3 Japan
The corporate governance practice in Japan is by nature non-static and tends to be influenced by market
and economic conditions, as well as prominent corporate scandals that push for further reform (Buchanan,
2018).
In response to the “lost decade” of Japan, a period of time where economic progress seemed to stagnate,
the Japanese government pushed forward for two separate initiatives in 2002 and 2003. The first initiative
was pushed forward by Ota Seiichi, the head of Administrative Reform Task Force at the Liberal
Democratic Party, and who was also a former professor of economics at Fukouka University.
The first initiative took the form of an amendment to the Commercial Code (Act No. 48 of 1899), thereby
strengthening the position of the corporate auditor ‘kansayaku’ by requiring that at least three auditors are
appointed, with half or more of them being external (i.e. not employees of the company in question).
The second initiative also took the form of an amendment to the Commercial Code and was pushed
forward by the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice. It introduced a new optional corporate
governance model, whereby companies could opt to replace the requirement of appointing corporate
auditors ‘kansayaku’ with having three board committees, namely the audit committee, nomination
committee, and the remuneration committee, all of which would be required to appoint a majority of
external and non-executive directors.
This second initiative intended to separate the day-to-day business operation function of the company from
the supervisory function of the board, demonstrated by recognising the executive officer class
‘shikkyouyaku’. This initiative faced a lot of resistance from listed companies, as it was described as an
‘American corporate governance’ structure, commonly associated with the Enron scandal that took place
during that time (Nikkei, 2003).
Both these initiatives continued to co-exist, with companies having the choice to opt for either option.
Unfortunately, this compromise of a solution did not address the underlying poor corporate governance
practices followed by Japanese companies. This, in turn, led to Japanese companies continuing to lose
market share to foreign competitors, as exemplified by the market share of the Japanese electrical
machinery sector, where total exports dropped from 12.2% in 2000 to 4.4% in 2014 (Inui and Kim, 2016).
To address this issue once again, the Companies Law (Act No. 86 of 2005) was amended in June 2014,
shifting the legal obligations associated with corporate matters from the Commercial Code to the
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Companies Law. The amendment took effect in May 2015, and introduced an additional new corporate
governance model, which required companies to only have an audit committee, instead of the three-
committee model introduced by the second imitative. This newly introduced model was intended to be a
mid-way solution between the corporate auditor model and the three-committee model.
The amendment was also coupled with the publishing of the Stewardship Code and the Corporate
Governance Code in 2014 and 2015 respectively. These codes were considered to be ‘soft laws’, utilising
the ‘comply or explain’ practice adopted by the EU and the OECD, which have been deemed effective in
implementing better corporate governance practices (Sanderson and Seidl, 2013).
This combination of legislative tools has significantly improved the corporate governance practices in
Japan on many fronts, such as shareholder activism, with Japanese publicly listed companies receiving
record numbers of shareholder proposals in 2019 (Huh et al., 2020) and an increase in the number of
outside directors from 18% in 2013 to 91% in 2019 (The Japan Times, 2019).
Most recently, the Companies Act has been amended as of 4 December 2019 based substantially on an
interim proposal and an outline issued by the Japanese Legislative Council prior to the case of Ghosn. This
amendment – amongst other things – makes the appointment of outside directors mandatory for Japanese
listed companies (Jones Day, 2020).
As of the date of this paper, Japan allows publicly listed companies to adopt one of the three corporate
governance models, namely:
(i) Corporate auditor governance model, referred to as the ‘Company with a Board of Auditors’
under the Companies Act;
(ii) Three-committee model, referred to as the ‘Company with Committees’ under the Companies
Act; and
(iii) Audit committee model, referred to as the ‘Company with an Audit Committee’ under the
Companies Act.
While companies are given the flexibility to choose the corporate governance model that suits their
business best, such reforms may have not been sufficient to prevent corporate misconduct, as illustrated by
the case of Nissan’s ex-chairman, Carlos Ghosn.
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3 Literature Review
There are two main theories in academia that examines the benefits and disadvantages of CEO duality,
which are: (i) the agency theory; and (ii) the stewardship theory.
According to the agency theory, the agent commits to opportunistic behaviour and abuse of position for
excessive benefits, usually at the expense of shareholder interests. In this case, the CEO is considered the
agent and the practice of CEO duality is deemed undesirable as it grants too much power to a single
individual, which in turns weakens the ability of the board to effectively monitor the CEO. Further, CEO
duality promotes entrenchment by reducing board-monitoring effectiveness (Finkelstein and D’Aveni,
1994).
The stewardship theory, on the other hand, argues that CEO duality is beneficial to the performance of the
company as it allows for a unified command and control, leading to superior shareholder returns
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991), as well as ultimately reducing costs and inefficiencies that may arise from
having two leadership roles instead of one (Brickley et al., 1997).
However, the evidence of the impact of CEO duality on firm performance is weak and most studies
continue to be unable to find a statistically significant link between the two components (Rechner and
Dalton, 1989).
To address this inherent issue, newer studies have considered different empirical approaches to assess the
impact of CEO duality, such as that non-duality positively impacts future firm performance when current
performance is poor and vice versa (Krause and Semadeni, 2013) or that when a firm faces a change in the
competitive environment, firms with CEO duality leadership structures outperform firms with non-duality
leadership structures (Yang and Zhao, 2014).
A comprehensive study conducted by Krause et al. (2014), presented in Table 1 (Effect of CEO Duality on
Firm Performance) below, lists a number of studies attempting to find a causal link between CEO duality
and firm performance, and concludes that such a link is weak at best and often insufficient to make a
definitive determination on this matter.
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Table 1
Effect of CEO Duality on Firm Performance
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= price-earnings ratio; ROA = return on assets; ROE = return on equity; ROI = return on investment.
While the above studies show that there may not be a statistically significant link between CEO duality
and firm performance on a global level, the same may not necessarily be applicable to Japan. Accordingly,
this paper seeks to firstly confirm if such a link exists for Japanese publicly listed companies by
conducting a quantitative analysis, as presented in chapters 4 and 5 below.
The following hypotheses have been derived from the research question:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms with poorer financial performance are less likely to have CEO
Duality.
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): CEO duality decreases firm performance.
4 Methodology
4.1 Sample
This paper examines all publicly listed companies in the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
as of 30 April 2020, excluding companies operating in the following sectors: (i) financial institutions; (ii)
banking; (iii) insurance; (iv) financial services; and (v) electric power and gas. The rationale for excluding
such industries is the regulatory environments by which they are governed (Tsui et al., 2001). This resulted
in a total sample size of 1,497 publicly listed companies.
The data collected was from the TSE, the Osiris database by Bureau van Dijk, and the eol database by
ProNexus over the period ranging from 2015 to 2019. Due to the time-lag design in all the models, the data
for all the independent variables and control variables were collected for the period ranging from 2015 to
2018, whereas the data for the dependent variables were collected for the period ranging from 2016 to
2019.
4.2 Measurements for H1
For the dependent variable, CEO duality was used as a dichotomous variable with ‘0’ standing for duality
and ‘1’ standing for separation of CEO and Chair role. For the purposes of this study, separation of the
CEO and Chair roles is deemed when an ‘other director’ is appointed as the Chair.
For the independent variable, the backward-looking measure of return on equity (ROE) was employed as a
measure of a firm’s performance (Stickney & Weil, 1994). For the purposes of this hypothesis, the ROE
average for the years 2016, 2017, and 2018 was employed.
Several control variables have been employed for this hypothesis, which are as follows:
i. Company Size: measured by the natural logarithm of the company’s total assets at the end of
each fiscal year;
ii. Company Age: measured by the number of years since incorporation;
iii. Debt-Asset Ratio: a leverage ratio to assess the company’s ability to receive external funding;
iv. Percentage of Outside Directors: refers to the percentage of outside directors on the board of the
company; and
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v. Disclosure of Director Remuneration: a dummy variable, which was set at ‘1’ if the company
disclosed its director remuneration and ‘0’ otherwise.
4.3 Measurements for H2
For the dependent variable, the backward-looking measure of ROE was employed as a measure of a firm’s
performance.
As for the independent variable for this study, CEO duality was used as a dichotomous variable with ‘0’
standing for duality and ‘1’ standing for separation of CEO and Chair roles.
The control variables employed for this hypothesis are the same as the ones listed in sub-chapter 4.2
(Measurements for H1).
Further, the following interactions have also been employed:
i. Separation_Outside: CEO Duality * Percentage of Outside Directors; and
ii. Separation_Remuneration: CEO Duality * Disclosure of Director Remuneration.
5 Results
5.1 Results for H1
Multiple regression analysis was used for this hypothesis, with Table 6 (Regression Analysis of H1: CEO
Duality on Firm Performance) presenting the results of the analysis. The table shows that there is no
statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance, which is in line with the
findings of the academic studies conducted in this regard, as presented in chapter 2 (Literature Review).
However, a positive relationship between non-duality and company size was identified, which indicated
that larger companies opted for non-duality more than smaller companies. An additional positive
relationship, also identified, is between non-duality and the percentage of outside directors, where
companies with non-duality have a higher percentage of outside directors.
Further, a panel data analysis was conducted due to the availability of cross-section data and time-series
data for all of the abovementioned variables, leading to a total of 128 observations. The reason for this low
number of observations is due to the nature of the data, as the dependent variable, CEO duality, is a
dichotomous variable.
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Using the Hausman test, the fixed effect model was set as the superior model. The results of this analysis
are presented in Table 8 (Panel Data Analysis of H1: CEO Duality on Firm Performance). The results also
indicated a positive relationship between non-duality and the percentage of outside directors, confirming
the findings of the multiple regression analysis.
5.2 Results for H2
Multiple regression analysis was used for this hypothesis, with Table 7 (Regression Analysis of H2: Firm
Performance on CEO Duality) presenting the results of the analysis. The table shows that there is no
statistically significant relationship between firm performance and CEO duality, which is also in line with
the findings of the academic studies conducted in this regard, as presented in chapter 2 (Literature Review).
However, a positive relationship between firm performance and the percentage of outside directors was
identified, indicating that companies with a higher percentage of outside directors sitting on their boards
enjoyed a higher ROE.
Further, a panel data analysis was conducted due to the availability of cross-section data and time-series
data for all of the abovementioned variables, leading to a total of 5,972 observations.
Using the Hausman test, the fixed effect model was set as the superior model. The results of this analysis
are presented in Table 9 (Panel Data Analysis of H2: Firm Performance on CEO Duality). The results also
indicated a positive relationship between firm performance and the percentage of outside directors.
Accordingly, both analyses present a robust result of a statistically significant link between firm
performance and the percentage of outside directors in Japanese companies.
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Table 2
















ROE average (Year -
1,-2,-3) 0.008182718 1
Total Assets Natural
Log 0.149871903 0.073517284 1
Years since
Incorporation 0.059779089 -0.136776282 0.272737558 1
Debt-Asset Ratio (%) 0.032862818 -0.054925373 0.239140129 0.062511702 1
Outside Directors (%) 0.214479225 -0.039434356 0.039128155 -0.035711696 0.001259759 1
Director Remuneration
Disclosed 0.086135553 0.091416717 0.410223415 0.013161678 0.033892932 0.085892697 1
20
Table 3
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for H2
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Table 5 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for H2
Outside Directors (%) Director Remuneration Disclosed Separation_Outside Separation_Remuneration
Mean 30.00707946 Mean 0.167448091 Mean 1.121113388 Mean 0.007367716
Standard Error 0.294197814 Standard Error 0.009666324 Standard Error 0.189292663 Standard Error 0.002213993
Median 28.57142857 Median 0 Median 0 Median 0
Standard Deviation 11.36761471 Standard Deviation 0.373500556 Standard Deviation 7.314147011 Standard Deviation 0.085547265
Sample Variance 129.2226642 Sample Variance 0.139502666 Sample Variance 53.4967465 Sample Variance 0.007318335
Kurtosis 1.616751119 Kurtosis 1.181094103 Kurtosis 51.16476975 Kurtosis 131.1776082
Skewness 0.979829584 Skewness 1.783119099 Skewness 7.0052949 Skewness 11.53264438
Range 85.71428571 Range 1 Range 75 Range 1
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0
Maximum 85.71428571 Maximum 1 Maximum 75 Maximum 1
Sum 44800.56964 Sum 250 Sum 1673.822289 Sum 11
Count 1493 Count 1493 Count 1493 Count 1493
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Table 6
Regression Analysis of H1: CEO Duality on Firm Performance













































Adjusted R2 0.02087904 0.020229991 0.063920649 0.063482831
F value 11.60527042 8.70158984 21.37639416 17.85613931
NOB 1493 1493 1493 1493
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Table 6 (continued)
Regression Analysis of H1: CEO Duality on Firm Performance







































Adjusted R2 0.064549596 0.064112291 0.044998515 0.006087107
F value 26.73840296 21.44167008 36.15061788 5.568792216
NOB 1493 1493 1493 1493
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Table 7
Regression Analysis of H2: Firm Performance on CEO Duality
































































































































































































NOB 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493 1493
27
Table 8
Panel Data Analysis of H1: CEO Duality on Firm Performance
DV=ROE (1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO/Chair Separation -0.04 -0.16 -3.80
(1.50) (1.50) (4.13)
Total Assets Natural Log -3.25*** -3.25*** -3.69*** -3.68***
(0.80) (0.80) (0.84) (0.84)
Debt-Asset Ratio (%) 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)







Intercept 39.52*** 39.51*** 44.47*** 44.38***
(10.98) (10.98) (11.39) (11.39)
R-sq:
within 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
between 6.00E-04 6.00E-04 8.00E-04 8.00E-04
overall 0 0 1.00E-04 1.00E-04
NOB 5972 5972 5972 5972
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Table 9
Panel Data Analysis of H2: Firm Performance on CEO Duality
DV=CEO/Chair Separation (1) (2) (3)
ROE 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Total Assets Natural Log 6.74*** 5.00** 5.57**
(2.34) (2.36) (2.62)
Debt-Asset Ratio (%) -0.20** -0.19** -0.19**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)







log likelihood -39.10 -36.59 -33.94
NOB 128 128 128
5.3 Quantitative Results Overview
The data analysis conducted above confirms the lack of a statistically significant link between CEO
duality and firm performance, which is in line with the findings of chapter 3 (Literature Review) in
that despite the significant number of academic studies, the evidence of a causal link between CEO
duality and firm performance is weak at best and often insufficient to make a definitive
determination. Japan’s unique corporate culture did not differentiate it in this regard.
McNulty, Zattoni, and Douglas (2013) identify a clear lack of qualitative studies in the field of
corporate governance and encourage scholars to use qualitative tools in their studies. Accordingly,
this paper seeks to undertake a qualitative analysis of the research question by focusing on the case
of Carlos Ghosn.
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6 The Case of Carlos Ghosn
To present the case of Nissan’s ex-chairman, Carlos Ghosn, the history of the company must firstly
be considered. Back in 1999, Nissan was at the brink of bankruptcy, and Ghosn provided a much
needed 5.4 billion USD bailout in the form of an alliance with Renault. This deal granted Renault a
controlling share in Nissan of 37%, which would later increase to 43.4%, whilst Nissan on the other
hand acquired a 15% stake in Renault.
This alliance, which would later include Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (Mitsubishi), became the most
successful alliance of its kind in automotive industry, allowing for significant economies of scale
and sharing of technology and information (Nissan, 2018).
Ghosn was at the centre of this alliance, holding the positions of: (i) Renault Chair and CEO; (ii)
Nissan Chair and former CEO; and (iii) Mitsubishi Chair.
Ghosn benefitted handsomely from this successful alliance, earning a total declared compensation of
17 million USD in 2017 (Reuters, 2018).
Ghosn’s success came to a crashing halt on 19 November 2018, when he was arrested at Tokyo’s
Haneda airport for two charges, namely: (i) false reporting of annual remuneration; and (ii)
aggravated breach of trust.
As of 2009, listed companies in Japan are obliged by the Financial Services Agency to disclose
compensation of executives in excess of 100 million JPY. This compensation includes retirement
bonuses, if such amounts are fixed (Wakabayashi, 2010).
This obligation was problematic to Ghosn, who did not want to reveal his actual compensation. A
potential solution that was identified at the time was a deferred compensation mechanism, by which
Ghosn would declare receiving an annual compensation of 1 billion JPY per year, and have another
1 billion JPY of compensation deferred so as to be received upon his retirement (Sakamoto et al.
2019).
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Chart A: False reporting of Ghosn’s annual remuneration
Even with this attempt to hide Ghosn’s actual entitled compensation, shareholders were displeased
with the declared compensation, highlighting the cultural difference between Japan and other
western jurisdictions, such as the U.S., where shareholders are not as alarmed by CEOs earning high
salaries, as long as the companies are performing above average (Tonello, 2013).
It could be stated that this deferred compensation arrangement lies at the heart of the problem of the
first charge, with Ghosn’s lawyers arguing that this arrangement had not been fixed in nature and
therefore need not be declared.
The second charge, aggravated breach of trust, was in relation to the alleged transfer of private
investment losses to Nissan in 2008 and the alleged transfer of Nissan funds to private companies
belonging to Ghosn’s family members. This charge consists of two separate cases, one referred to as
the ‘Saudi Arabia Route’, and the other as the ‘Oman Route’. Both cases involved alleged personal
enrichment via distribution of Nissan funds through complex channels to Ghosn and his direct
family members ultimately (Sakamoto et al., 2019).
There are several corporate governance issues at hand that may have led to this dilemma, which are
as follows:
(i) the unique reporting structure of Ghosn, in his capacity as Nissan Chair and former CEO, to
effectively report to himself in his capacity as Renault Chair and CEO;
(ii) the CEO duality structure that Ghosn held from 2008 to 2017 in Nissan; and
(iii) the lack of effective board oversight in Nissan to manage Ghosn’s behaviour.
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The below sub-chapters attempt to explain how these practices exacerbated the opportunities for
corporate misconduct.
6.1 Unique Reporting Structure
Ghosn, in his capacity as Chair and former CEO of Nissan, reported to himself in his capacity as
Chair and CEO of Renault, a situation that effectively inhibits any oversight over his actions in
Nissan.
Ghosn assumed the role of CEO and Chair of Nissan from 2008 onwards, stepping down from the
CEO role nine years later in 2017. From 2009 onwards, Ghosn also concurrently held the role of
CEO and Chair of Renault until 2019.
The overlap between these roles, as presented in the graph below, allowed Ghosn, in his capacity as
CEO and Chair of Nissan, to report to himself, in his capacity as CEO and Chair of Renault, for a
























Chart B: Overlap of Ghosn’s CEO/Chair role in Renault and Ghosn’s CEO/Chair role in Nissan
This convenient structure is an obvious red flag in the world of corporate governance. However,
Ghosn’s reputation and previous success fuelled the confidence of shareholders toward supporting
this structure rather than questioning it. Indeed, the Government of France, a shareholder with 15%
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ownership of the Renault, supported Ghosn’s role as both CEO and Chair of Renault (Campbell et
al., 2019).
6.2 Previous CEO Duality
As mentioned above, Ghosn held the role of CEO and Chair of Nissan from 2008 to 2017, a total
period of nine years. In 2017, he stepped down to have Hitoro Saikawa, Nissan’s former co-CEO
and a representative director, succeed him as CEO.
However, Ghosn continued to behave like a de facto CEO even after stepping down, as evidenced by
the report issued by the Nissan Special Committee for Improving Governance, which found that
Ghosn “did not relinquish any decision-making authority regarding Nissan’s human affairs and
compensation even after retiring as CEO in 2017” (Nissan SCIG, 2019).
By holding onto both roles for an extensive period of time, not relinquishing some of his authority
even after stepping down as CEO, and due to Ghosn’s reputation as the saviour of Nissan, he was
able to create a corporate culture in which employees could not defy or object to his actions.
The culture that empowered Ghosn to behave like an ‘imperial CEO’ was exacerbated by the fact
that he held on to both the CEO and Chair roles for a significant period of time. Indeed, even after
stepping down as CEO, he retained many of its powers. Had the roles been separated from the outset,
it would have been more difficult for Ghosn to retain some of the powers of one position while being
appointed in another.
6.3 Lack of Effective Board Oversight
As presented above, the unique oversight structure that Ghosn enjoyed, coupled with his history of
CEO duality granted him – in effect – unfettered authority to allegedly behave in a manner that was
not in the best interests of Nissan. A natural decision to arrive based on these two aspects is to avoid
such an oversight structure and prevent CEO duality.
However, another approach to manage these issues would have been through an effective board that
could oversee and manage Ghosn’s behaviour. Nissan’s board was infamous for not playing an
effective role, evidenced by the fact that its meetings were – on average – shorter than 20 minutes
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(Nissan SCIG, 2019), which is an impossibly short period of time to cover all the agenda items,
never mind effectively managing Ghosn’s behaviour.
One component of an effective board is the number of outside directors appointed by the company.
In 2015, Nissan had only one outside director, which was a former Renault executive. In 2018,
Nissan added two new outside directors, both of which lacked the necessary business or
management experience, as one was a race-car driver, and the other a former bureaucrat in Japan.
This weak board structure and membership worked in Ghosn’s favour, as he – in his capacity as
Chair – could streamline the decision-making process without facing much resistance from the board.
This, in turn, allowed Ghosn to behave in the manner that was not beneficial to Nissan.
As proposed by the Nissan Special Committee for Improving Corporate Governance, an internal
body at Nissan that was tasked with identifying the root causes for Ghosn’s alleged corporate
misconduct and the potential solutions to address such root causes, the implementation of the three-
committee model in Nissan could have played an effective role in managing Ghosn. The below sub-
chapters elaborate on how each one of the committees could have played a role in managing Ghosn.
6.3.1 Audit Committee
Under the Japanese Companies Act, listed companies are required to have an independent auditor. In
the case of Nissan, the auditor was the Japanese affiliate of Ernst & Young (EY), which has shown
questionable judgement due to its involvement in the major accounting frauds of both Olympus and
Toshiba (Inagaki and Lewis, 2018).
The lack of an audit committee in Nissan meant that the Chair would, subject to the board's approval,
select the independent auditor. This approach allowed Ghosn to directly select EY, leading to a
relationship that may potentially have EY side with him when facing ‘grey area’ issues, such as that
of deferred compensation. While it could be argued that there is no definitive proof of EY siding
with Ghosn on ‘grey area’ issues, the optics remained unfavourable and could have been easily
avoided had there been an audit committee to appoint the independent auditor instead.
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If an audit committee were in place, it would appoint the independent auditor instead of Ghosn,
setting a layer of separation that could allow the independent auditor to perform its job adequately
and report its findings to the audit committee, which would then report it to the board.
6.3.2 Compensation Committee
The duty of a compensation committee, amongst other matters, is to determine the remuneration and
overall compensation of the company’s executive management. This committee would usually
consist of independent directors to avoid any potential conflict of interests.
As Nissan did not have such a committee, Nissan’s board determined the compensation of Ghosn,
and while Ghosn argued that “the board is sovereign [on his compensation]”, the influence he had on
the board, in his capacity as Chair, significantly undermined any such sovereignty (Pozen, 2018).
The fact that the board meetings were shorter than 20 minutes similarly reinforces this point.
If a compensation committee were in place, it would determine Ghosn’s compensation, rather than
granting him the power to, effectively, determine his own compensation.
6.3.3 Nomination Committee
Usually, a nomination committee would have the authority to determine the appointment and
dismissal of directors and CEOs. The purpose of this committee would be to ensure that suitable
directors and CEOs are appointed, having the right expertise and experience.
Due to the lack of such a committee, Nissan’s board consisted of directors that did not have the right
skills to fulfil their responsibilities effectively.
If a nomination committee were in place, it would appoint an effective team of directors that would
identify all the red flags in Ghosn’s behaviour and manage him effectively before his corporate
misconduct reached its level of staggering proportions.
7 Discussion
The discussion consists of two sub-chapters, namely: (i) CEO Duality; and (ii) Corporate
Governance Reforms Post-Ghosn. The former sub-chapter will take into consideration the outcomes
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of both quantitative and qualitative analyses, as well as other influencing factors, such as foreign
institutional investors, to determine whether the practice of CEO duality should be avoided,
embraced, or neither in light of the above.
As for the latter sub-chapter, it will consider the likelihood of a corporate governance reform taking




The quantitative analysis conducted in chapter 5 (Results) above presents a set of results that show a
lack of a statistically significant link between CEO duality and firm performance, which is in line
with the findings of chapter 3 (Literature Review) in that earlier academic studies could not
definitively identify a causal link between CEO duality and firm performance.
Accordingly, it can be argued that – in general – there is no apparent benefit or drawback to
implementing the CEO duality corporate structure in Japan from a statistical perspective. However,
there may be cases where CEO duality could have a positive impact, such as in specific industries or
markets. In China, for example, post-IPO performance has been found to be positively associated
with CEO duality (Wang et al., 2017).
Previous literature supports this view, as evidenced by the study conducted by Yang and Zhao
(2014), where it was found that firms with CEO duality leadership structures outperform firms with
non-duality leadership structures when there is a change in the competitive environment, showing
that the practice of combining the role of the CEO and Chair could have its advantages in certain
circumstances.
Ultimately, looking at the quantitative analysis in isolation presents a case where there is no apparent
benefit or disadvantage to implementing the corporate governance structure of CEO duality.
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7.1.2 Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative analysis conducted above shows that the practice of CEO duality is problematic as it
can exacerbate poor corporate governance practices, highlighted most clearly in the case of Ghosn.
By holding on to the two most powerful positions in Nissan, Ghosn was able to carve a corporate
culture that benefitted him significantly at the expense of the company. It also allowed him to
continue influencing the decision-making process as a de facto CEO even after officially stepping
down from the CEO role in 2017.
This behaviour is not unique to Nissan. Japanese companies have faced this issue for a while with
their retired executives holding on to the roles such as senior advisor ‘soudan-yaku’ and executive
advisor ‘komon’ and influencing the decision-making process behind the scenes. According to a
survey conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, only 8% of Japanese
companies have abolished the senior advisor ‘soudan-yaku’ and executive advisor ‘komon’ positions
as of March 2019 (METI, 2019).
The Japanese government is acutely aware of this issue, as evidenced by Prime Minister Abe’s
speech in a public-private panel in early January of 2017, where he stated that “we will eliminate the
opaque influence of retired executives on their former businesses, and make it possible for
companies to make bold business decisions by strengthening the supervisory functions of their board
of directors” (Prime Ministr of Japan and His Cabinet, 2017).
The influence of retired executives continues to be a problem for corporate Japan, and if such retired
executives followed the CEO duality structure prior to retirement, their influence would naturally be
more significant, which in turn would further hamper the ability of newly appointed CEOs to fulfil
their obligations as the chief executive of the company in question.
However, the truth remains that Ghosn’s leadership turned Nissan around from a company in
extreme debt to become incredibly successful despite long odds. It could be argued that the CEO
duality structure supported Ghosn in achieving this success, whereas having a separate Chair that
would question Ghosn’s every step and decision could have disrupted his ability to lead the business
towards success, especially as some of his decisions were deemed controversial in its early days.
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The question that therefore arises for shareholders is whether they are willing to risk granting the
CEO unfettered authority by having this individual be the Chair of the company as well, thereby
risking troublesome corporate behaviour similar to that of Ghosn, in return for a unified and
streamlined leadership structure in the company.
The qualitative analysis of this paper further found that, besides the CEO duality issue, there were
two other inherent issues in Nissan that led to the Ghosn case, which were: (i) Ghosn’s unique
reporting structure in his capacity as Nissan Chair and former CEO; and (ii) the lack of effective
board oversight.
Accordingly, it could be argued that avoiding CEO duality – on its own – may not be sufficient to
prevent corporate scandals of this nature. Further, the qualitative analysis of this paper faces a
critical limitation in that it has only considered one case in-depth, which is that of Carlos Ghosn. It
may be that this case is an anomaly rather than a systematic issue of corporate governance.
7.1.3 Influence of an Effective Board
Nissan’s previous board did not play an effective role in managing Ghosn due to the lack of
competent board members and the incredibly short period of time allocated for the board meetings,
as presented above in chapter 6 (The Case of Carlos Ghosn).
Therefore, it can be argued that a robust and effective board could have managed the behaviour of
Ghosn, even with the presence of the CEO duality structure in Nissan. However, there is an inherent
issue with such an approach, as the Chair of the board would be the CEO, thereby making it “much
more difficult for the board to perform its critical function” of independently monitoring the CEO
(Jensen, 1993).
To manage this issue, the board can be effective by implementing the three-committee model,
introducing a layer of separation between the board and the decisions associated with nomination,
remuneration, and audit. This model is commonly utilised by foreign institutional investors, such as
Sony and Nomura (Passador, 2016). As explained below, the presence of foreign institutional
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investors is becoming more prevalent in Japan, which in turn may push for implementation of the
three-committee model in a larger group of Japanese listed companies.
However, Lawley (2007) finds that the effectiveness of the three-committee model depends
predominantly on the presence of outside directors, where the lack thereof would inhibit the
effectiveness of such a model. Accordingly, this model can only be considered effective when a
large percentage of outside directors is present in the composition of the board.
Based on the above, it could be deduced that the negative influences associated with CEO duality, as
referred to in the qualitative analysis, can be countered by having a large number of outside directors
in the board of the company in question.
However, the quantitative analysis conducted in chapter 5 (Results) above shows a statistically
significant link between the percentage of outside directors and non-duality, where the larger the
percentage of outside directors in a company, the more likely that it would opt for a non-duality
structure.
Therefore, companies with a large percentage of outside directors are statistically more likely to
steer the company towards a structure of non-duality, rather than attempting to manage the potential
negative behaviours associated with CEO duality.
Such an approach would render this argument inapplicable, as an effective board would require the
presence of outside directors, and companies with a large percentage of outside directors are
statistically more likely to adopt a non-duality corporate structure in the first place.
39
7.1.4 Influence of Foreign Institutional Investment
From the perspective of corporate value, foreign institutional investors take into consideration the
corporate governance structure of the company and specifically whether the CEO duality structure in
a publicly listed company is implemented or not. Lawrence De Maria, an analyst at the investment
company William Blair & Co. states that they prefer to see the roles separated (Sun, 2019). Rosanna
Landis-Weaver, a program manager at As You Sow, a non-profit investor advocacy group, further
adds that it’s a low-hanging fruit to please the shareholders (Gryta and Francis, 2019).
Other investment companies and think tanks are noting that the practice of separating these two
posts is becoming standard practice globally, as highlighted by Kosmas Papadopoulos, executive
director of thought leadership at ISS Analytics (Mooney, 2019).
Accordingly, it may be the case that foreign institutional investors may – as shareholders – pressure
Japanese publicly listed companies to separate the CEO and Chair roles. If that is the case, such
companies can pre-empt and avoid this form of pressure by switching to a non-duality structure.
On the other end of the spectrum, Japanese publicly listed companies could lose out on potential
investment from such foreign institutional investors, as such investors would not tolerate the CEO
duality structure in such companies.
In either case, there is a valid argument for Japanese publicly listed companies that seek foreign
direct investment to align themselves with the increasingly global corporate governance standard of
separating the CEO and Chair roles.
7.1.5 Globalisation Influence
Looking at other countries, such as the United States, the allegations against Ghosn conjure the
memories of the corporate scandals that led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. One of the
core aspects of this Act was to adjust the CEO and board power dynamics so that there is less risk of
an ‘imperial CEO’ and higher likelihood of an independent and effective board (Peregrine, 2018).
With the clear globalisation trends taking place in Japan and with the memory of the scandals that
led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Japanese government may follow a similar route to the United
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States in hopes of reducing the likelihood of corporate scandals and attracting further foreign
investment, as elaborated above.
Accordingly, it can be argued that the influence of globalisation in Japan may be applicable to the
field of corporate governance, and as the separation of the CEO and Chair is the ‘gold standard’
according to the OECD Corporate Governance Principles, and with the growing number of listed
companies in both United States and Europe separating the two roles, it is plausible that Japan may
follow suit. If that course of action were to take place, the Japanese government would most likely
implement it in the form of a revision to its Corporate Governance Code.
In summary, while the quantitative analysis does not provide an argument for or against CEO duality,
the qualitative analysis finds that CEO duality, while problematic, on its own may not be sufficient
to prevent corporate scandals such as the case of Ghosn. An effective board, with a large percentage
of outside directors, could potentially counter this issue and is statistically likely to opt for non-
duality. Further, an analysis of foreign institutional investors and globalisation shows a clear
preference for non-duality.
7.2 Corporate Governance Reforms Post-Ghosn
Corporate scandals draw attention to failures in corporate governance. As a system of checks and
balances designed to identify and address the root causes of corporate misconduct, the purpose of
corporate governance is to prevent corporate scandals from erupting in the first place.
When corporate governance, as a system, fails, it calls for reform. Indeed, Japan has witnessed this
reaction in the past, where a series of corporate scandals during the 1990s led to the establishment of
the Japanese Corporate Governance Forum and the issuance of the Corporate Governance Principles.
This document, amongst other things, called for differentiation between the decision-making and
execution bodies (Buchanan et al., 2018).
Even the Japanese Business Federation ‘Keidanren’, which tends to support established corporate
practices in Japan, urged for corporate governance changes during 1997 in a paper ‘Urgent
recommendations concerting corporate governance’ (Keidanren, 1997).
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Ultimately, these efforts translated into the corporate governance reforms referred to above in sub-
chapter 2.3 (Japan), which have been effective to a certain extent, but not sufficient to prevent
Nissan’s corporate scandal.
It is unclear whether the case of Carlos Ghosn – on its own – is sufficient to trigger further reform in
this field and whether the practice of CEO duality would be deemed poor corporate governance
practice in Japan that needs to be revised in light of this case. However, such reform can be
considered as a possibility to avoid the reoccurrence of scandals of this nature, as well as to attract
investment in Japanese companies from abroad.
If such reform is to take place, it may occur informally, through collective action by publicly listed
companies (e.g. opting for non-duality, a three-committee model, and/ or higher percentage of
outside directors), or formally, through the revision of the relevant Japanese laws and regulations, or
a mix of both.
Buchanan et al. (2018) clarifies this point well, stating that “many of the norms and practices which
make up ‘corporate governance’, in its broad meaning of the governance and management of legally
constituted business firms, operate beyond the scope of the formal rules contained in company law
statutes and codes of practices”. Indeed, corporate governance is a set of practices that cannot be
fully addressed by formal rules and regulations, with some courses of action being left to the
judgement of executives and directors.
7.2.1 Informal Collective Action
Japanese listed companies may opt for improved corporate governance structures, even if their
previous structures were not considered illegal in Japan. In the case of CEO duality, it may be that
Japanese listed companies opt for non-duality structures, as is taking place in the United States and
Europe. Such changes would be welcomed by foreign institutional investors.
Another measure that Japanese listed companies can take is to strengthen the effectiveness of their
respective boards, which could be done by increasing the percentage of outside directors, as well as
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opting for a three-committee model, both of which would also be changes welcomed by and
designed to attract foreign institutional investment.
7.2.2 Formal Reforms
Alternatively, the Japanese government could incorporate the non-duality corporate governance
structure and strengthen board effectiveness by way of a legal mandate, such as a revision of the
Japanese Companies Act, thereby not leaving Japanese listed companies with much of a choice in
this regard.
This latter approach is commonly referred to as a ‘hard law’, as it would be in the form of a precise
and binding obligation on companies (Abott and Snidal, 2000), whereas ‘soft law’ would be in the
form of a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism that is not formally binding in nature.
The most recent amendment of the Japanese Companies Act in December 2019 to mandate the
appointment of outside directors in Japanese listed companies is a clear example of a 'hard law' to
strengthen board effectiveness in Corporate Japan.
If the Japanese government deems it necessary to incorporate the non-duality corporate governance
structure by way of a legal mandate, it is more likely to follow the ‘soft law’ approach, as it has
previously implemented the ‘comply or explain’ mechanism in the past under the Japanese
Corporate Governance Code.
As for strengthening board effectiveness, the Japanese government has already taken a major step in
this regard by mandating the appointment of outside directors, despite the divergent viewpoints on
this issue (Jones Day, 2019). At this point in time, it is unlikely that the government will introduce
any further hard laws to increase the percentage of outside directors, but may propose revising the
Japanese Corporate Governance Code to introduce a 'soft law' that would lead to increasing this
percentage.
Another tool to strengthening board effectiveness, as described above, is the adoption of the three-
committee model. This model is currently allowed under the Companies Act, and setting it as the
only available option to Japanese listed companies could be deemed a 'hard law', which would be
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highly unlikely, given the circumstances and history behind this model, as explained in sub-chapter
2.3 (Japan) above.
If the case of Ghosn is sufficient as a threshold to trigger a revision of the Japanese Corporate
Governance Code by the Japanese government, then the separation of the CEO and Chair roles, as
presented below, could be addressed to reduce the risk of corporate scandals similar to that of
Ghosn’s and to attract further foreign investment into Japan.
If Ghosn’s case does not trigger a revision of the Code, then the potential negative behaviours
associated with CEO duality could be managed by an effective board that implements the three-
committee model with a high percentage of outside directors, as explained below.
7.2.3 Separation of CEO and Chair Roles
Under the current Japan Corporate Governance Code, the practice of separation of the CEO and
Chair positions is not addressed, nor does the Code employ the ‘comply or explain’ approach
towards this issue.
It may be the case that combining the roles of the CEO and the Chair for a company is a necessity
due to the unique nature of the company’s business or the competitive environment in which it
operates. In such cases, the ‘comply or explain’ approach would be effective, as it would allow
companies to explain their deviation from this principle to the satisfaction of shareholders.
If a Japanese publicly listed company can opt for non-duality without negatively impacting its
performance, then such a company should seek to implement a corporate governance structure that
separates the CEO and Chair roles, as it can reap the benefits of the non-duality structure, such as
closer alignment to the ‘gold standard’ OECD corporate governance principles, as well as attracting
foreign institutional investment for the reasons described in sub-chapter 7.1.47.1.4 (Influence of
Foreign Institutional Investment).




Panel Data Analysis of H1: CEO Duality on Firm Performance
DV=ROE (1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO/Chair Separation -0.04 -0.16 -3.80
(1.50) (1.50) (4.13)
Total Assets Natural Log -3.25*** -3.25*** -3.69*** -3.68***
(0.80) (0.80) (0.84) (0.84)
Debt-Asset Ratio (%) 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)







Intercept 39.52*** 39.51*** 44.47*** 44.38***
(10.98) (10.98) (11.39) (11.39)
R-sq:
within 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
between 6.00E-04 6.00E-04 8.00E-04 8.00E-04
overall 0 0 1.00E-04 1.00E-04
NOB 5972 5972 5972 5972
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Table 9
Panel Data Analysis of H2: Firm Performance on CEO Duality
DV=CEO/Chair Separation (1) (2) (3)
ROE 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Total Assets Natural Log 6.74*** 5.00** 5.57**
(2.34) (2.36) (2.62)
Debt-Asset Ratio (%) -0.20** -0.19** -0.19**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)







log likelihood -39.10 -36.59 -33.94
NOB 128 128 128
7.3 Quantitative Results Overview
The data analysis conducted above confirms the lack of a statistically significant link between CEO
duality and firm performance, which is in line with the findings of chapter 3 (Literature Review) in
that despite the significant number of academic studies, the evidence of a causal link between CEO
duality and firm performance is weak at best and often insufficient to make a definitive
determination. Japan’s unique corporate culture did not differentiate it in this regard.
McNulty, Zattoni, and Douglas (2013) identify a clear lack of qualitative studies in the field of
corporate governance and encourage scholars to use qualitative tools in their studies. Accordingly,
this paper seeks to undertake a qualitative analysis of the research question by focusing on the case
of Carlos Ghosn.
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The Case of Carlos Ghosn) above explained that effective board oversight by way of adopting
the three-committee model, coupled with a high percentage of outside directors, could manage the
risks associated with CEO duality.
While such a model is permitted under Japanese law, it is not the only model available to publicly
listed companies, and the number of companies that have implemented this model are very low,
standing currently at 2%, with the majority of companies opting for statutory auditor model at 71%,
and the audit committee model accounting for 27% (ISS, 2019).
This model, if successfully implemented during the Ghosn era, could have played a significant role
in hampering the alleged corporate misconduct by Ghosn. However, it is necessary to highlight that
this model has deemed to be empirically effective only when coupled with a higher percentage of
outside directors (Lawley, 2007).
Therefore, the combination of a three-committee model, coupled with a large percentage of outside
directors, could effectively address the alleged corporate misconduct by Ghosn and may in fact
address underlying issues with the CEO duality structure by simply steering companies towards non-
duality structures, as evidenced by the results of the quantitative analysis.
As implementing this corporate governance structure is permitted under the Japanese legal
framework and is in line with the OECD corporate governance standards, Japanese publicly listed
companies should opt for this structure to reduce the likelihood of corporate scandals and attract
foreign investment into their companies.
8 Conclusion
This paper considered whether publicly listed companies should avoid the practice of CEO duality in
light of the corporate scandal of Nissan’s ex-Chair and ex-CEO, Carlos Ghosn. In addressing this
question, the paper considered the corporate governance developments that took place globally,
before focusing on specific countries and regions, namely the United States, Europe, and Japan.
The literature review presented the lack of a definitive link between CEO duality and firm
performance despite the academic interest in this field. To confirm whether such literature is
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applicable to the unique corporate culture of Japan, a quantitative analysis was conducted to assess
whether a statistically significant link between CEO duality and firm performance is present in all
publicly listed companies in the First Section of the TSE.
The quantitative analysis generated robust results, identifying the following statistically significant
links:
 non-duality and company size, where larger companies opted for non-duality structures
more than smaller companies;
 non-duality and the percentage of outside directors, where companies with non-duality
structures had a higher percentage of outside directors; and
 firm performance and the percentage of outside directors, where companies with a higher
percentage of outside directors enjoyed higher ROE.
However, the quantitative analysis did not identify a statistically significant link between non-duality
and firm performance, the results of which are in line with the literature review.
A qualitative analysis was then conducted, with specific focus on the case of Carlos Ghosn,
identifying therein the corporate governance issues that arose and how such issues could have been
addressed. The analysis ultimately found that the unique reporting structure whereby Ghosn – in his
capacity as CEO and Chair of Nissan – reported to himself in his capacity as CEO and Chair of
Renault, the CEO duality structure that Ghosn enjoyed for a total period of 8 years, and the lack of
effective board oversight were critical factors that allowed for his alleged corporate misconduct.
The discussion chapter consisted of two sub-chapters: (i) CEO duality; and (ii) Corporate
Governance Reforms Post-Ghosn. The first sub-chapter considered CEO duality from the
perspective of the analyses conducted, as well as other factors that may influence companies in this
regard, to determine whether the practice of CEO duality should be avoided, embraced, or neither in
light of the above.
Firstly, the results of the quantitative analysis was considered, noting therein that there is no
apparent benefit or disadvantage to implementing the CEO duality structure, whereas the qualitative
analysis found that CEO duality, while problematic to Nissan, was not the only corporate
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governance issue identified. Further, the analysis found that the case of Ghosn – on its own – is not
sufficient evidence to push for non-duality as it can be argued that Ghosn’s case is an anomaly rather
than a systemic issue with the corporate governance of Japan that requires reform.
The chapter then steered towards considering how CEO duality can be effectively managed by the
board, where it was identified that a three-committee model may allow the board to be effective,
provided that a large percentage of outside directors are present in the composition of the board.
The discussion built on this point by finding that for a board to be effective, it would have to adopt
the three-committee model, and for this model to be effective, there would have to be a large
percentage of outside directors in the board. However, outside directors are statistically more likely
to steer companies towards non-duality, therefore rendering this argument inapplicable, as an
effective board would ultimately avoid CEO duality altogether.
The chapter then considered the influence of foreign institutional investors, noting that a growing
number of institutional investors outside of Japan are of the view that the roles of the CEO and Chair
should be separated.
The latter part of the discussion chapter considered the likelihood of a corporate governance reform
post-Ghosn, noting that it is a possibility, and that the reform would most likely take the shape of a
revision of the Japanese Corporate Governance Code to introduce the ‘comply or explain’
mechanism to the separation of the CEO and Chair roles, whereby companies are obliged to separate
the roles of the CEO and the Chair, or otherwise explain why the CEO duality structure is more
suitable for their business operations.
However, the path of least resistance, as presented in the discussion chapter, could be in the form of
increasing the percentage of outside directors in companies due to two reasons: (i) the statistically
significant link between the percentage of outside directors and firm performance, where companies
enjoy better returns when there is a higher percentages of outside directors; and (ii) the statistically
significant link between the percentage of outside directors and non-duality, where companies with
higher percentages of outside directors are more likely to opt for non-duality structures.
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This approach would mean that by having a higher percentage of outside directors in Japanese
publicly listed companies, such companies can enjoy higher returns as well as avoiding the issues
associated with the CEO duality structure altogether.
The discussion does find that increasing the percentage of outside directors by way of a ‘hard law’ is
unlikely, given the most recent amendment of the Companies Act in late 2019 to require the
appointment of at least one outside directors in Japanese listed companies. It does highlight,
however, that increasing the percentage of outside directors can be enforced by way of a ‘soft law’
in the form of a revision to the Japanese Corporate Governance Code.
In any case, decisions made in this regard by the Japanese government will have to be carefully
considered, as the CEO duality structure may have its benefits for certain Japanese companies and
opting for non-duality could be detrimental to the leadership of such companies.
As for Japanese publicly listed companies, due to the statistically significant link between firm
performance and the percentage of outside directors, such companies should aim to increase the
number of outside directors so as to enjoy better financial returns. This, in turn, will result in such
companies steering ultimately towards a non-duality structure, as companies with a high percentage
of outside directors are more likely to opt for non-duality structures, which is in line with the
findings of the quantitative analysis. Further, companies with non-duality structures are also more
likely to attract foreign institutional investors as such structures are perceived to have better
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